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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

EDWARD H. JAMES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 920264-CA
Priority No. 2

:

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Appendix 1 to this brief contains the full text of:
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7 (1991 Repl. Vol.)
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 (1991 Repl. Vol.)
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) (1992)
United States Constitution, Amendment V
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV section 1.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court should not have signed the findings and
conclusions drafted by the prosecutor because the findings
contradicted the trial court's factual assessment of the case and
the evidence.
The record in this case demonstrates not only a Miranda
violation, but also coercive police conduct within the meaning of
the fifth amendment.

As the detective's incredible explanation for

why the detectives began the interrogation without a Miranda warning
demonstrates (because they needed to clarify Edward James7 unusual
names and birthdate), the detectives knew or should have known that
their express questioning of Mr. James would lead to an
incriminating response from him, and were seeking to evade the

Miranda requirements by initiating the interrogation with seemingly
innocuous questions (such as asking his address, which was
apparently next door to the burglary that the detectives had already
announced they were investigating). In interrogating Mr. James
while he was in custody, with two detectives, without the benefit of
Miranda, without recording the encounter, and in isolated
circumstances, the police conducted themselves in a coercive manner,
entitling Mr. James to suppression of all of his statements to the
police.
Because the police violated Mr. James7 federal
constitutional rights and he is entitled to suppression under
federal law, this Court need not reach the state constitutional
issues in this case.

However, because federal law governing

confessions is wanting and confusing, this Court should depart from
federal standards in this case.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT.
In its summary of Point I of Appellee's brief, the State
argues,
The trial court's adoption of the findings
and conclusions submitted by the prosecution was
not "merely mechanical." The court had given the
decision much thought and had the benefit of
defendant's filed objections to the findings and
conclusions. The record demonstrates that the
court adequately deliberated and considered the
merits of the case before adopting the proposed
findings and conclusions. Neither were the
findings contrary to any "oral finding" because
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the court entered few, if any, findings orally.
Finally the record supports the findings so they
were not in conflict with the evidence.
Brief of Appellee at 7.
If this Court will examine the record, this Court will see
that Judge Rokich initially ruled that the police were not
performing any administrative identification procedures when they
began to interrogate Mr. James, and should have given Mr. James a
Miranda warning before the interrogation (T. 20-24).

At the next

hearing, Judge Rokich indicated that the detectives should have
given Mr. James the Miranda warnings, but that his post-confession
and post-Miranda statements were voluntary and admissible under
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (T.2 1-2). The findings and
conclusions, however, indicate that the police owed Mr. James no
Miranda warnings because they were not interrogating him in asking
him identifying administrative guestions, and that if there was a
Miranda violation, the post-Miranda statements of Mr. James were
nonetheless voluntary and admissible (R. 85-87).

Because the

findings and conclusions conflicted with the views expressed in the
trial court's original findings and later ruling, the trial court
should not have adopted them.

Additional legal authority for Mr.

James' contention to this effect is found in State v. Mirquet, 203
Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (Utah App. 1993), where this Court recognized that
counsel-drafted findings and conclusions are not as instructive as a
court-drafted memorandum decision in appellate understanding of a
trial court's reasoning.

Id. at 35 n.4. Viewing the entire record

in this case, this Court can see that it was in fact that trial
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court's rationale that the detectives were not seeking to verify Mr.
James' identity when they began the interrogation without informing
Mr. James of his rights, in violation of Miranda.
The portions of the findings and conclusions justifying the
pre-Miranda statements as assisting the police to determine Mr.
James' identity are also legally insufficient because they are in
conflict with the evidence.

The State concedes that the detectives

intended to interrogate Mr. James, but argues that the initial
questions were, as indicated in the prosecution-drafted findings and
conclusions, designed to help the detectives ascertain that they
were really interrogating the right person.

The State makes this

argument on the basis of inference, rather than on the basis of a
record citation.

Brief of Appellee at 17. As the preliminary

hearing transcript which was presented to the trial court
demonstrates, the detectives were not seeking to determine whether
they were interviewing Edward James or not.

Detective Newren

testified that prior to the Miranda warnings the detectives informed
Mr. James that they were investigating a burglary (at a certain
address apparently next door to Mr. James7 residence) and asked Mr.
James some "identification" questions (R. 70). He then indicated
that the questions were "[c]larifying his name and different things
like that, because of the unusualness of the Edward and the James
and the date of birth." (R. 72). In sum, the trial court was
correct in initially finding that the detectives were seeking a
confession in interrogating Mr. James, rather than seeking to
ascertain his identity, and the findings and conclusions to the
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contrary are legally insufficient.

II.
FEDERAL LAW CALLS FOR SUPPRESSION
OF ALL OF MR. JAMES' STATEMENTS.
The summary of the State's argument in Point II of the
Appellee's brief indicates,
The court correctly denied the suppression
motion under the federal constitution because the
biographical data questions asked of defendant
were not "interrogation" in the Miranda sense.
Defendant's volunteered statement that he had
committed the burglary and theft did not come in
response to a question which the officers
reasonably should have known would have elicited
an incriminating response. Even if the
volunteered statement should have been
suppressed, the statements obtained after Miranda
warnings were given were admissible under federal
law. Finally, defendant's claim that the
officers did not record the statements is not
factually correct; they were recorded in the
officer's reports.
Brief of Appellee at 7-8.
The first problem with the State's position is that the
detectives were not seeking biographical data.

As the trial court

initially found, the detectives had Mr. James' biographical data on
his booking sheet (T. 20-24).

The State argues that the question

preceding Mr. James' admission, concerning Mr. James' employment,
was not interrogation because the detectives had no reasonable way
of knowing that the question was likely to lead to an incriminating
response.

Brief of Appellee at 26. The State's argument focuses

unduly on the one question, to the exclusion of the overall facts
which should have informed the detectives that their conduct was
likely to lead to an incriminating response.
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Detective Newren's

testimony that they informed Mr. James that they were investigating
the burglary at the apartment which is apparently next door to Mr.
James', and then began asking him questions including his address
before the Miranda warnings because of Edward James7 unusual names
and date of birth demonstrates that the detectives were not really
seeking biographical data, but were trying to evade the Miranda
requirements in interrogating Mr. James with apparently innocuous
questions.

This Court should not tolerate the detectives' tactics.

See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 610 (1990)(Marshall, J.,
concurring and dissenting)(citing cases recognizing that apparently
innocuous questions constitute interrogation if circumstances of
case demonstrate that questions and circumstances are reasonably
likely to lead to an incriminating response).
The State's argument that the police made an adequate
recording of their encounter with Mr. James by memorializing the
events in their police reports fails to appreciate the supreme
court's directives in State v. Carter, 776 P,2d 886, 891 (Utah
1989), to provide accurate records of custodial interrogations.

The

method used here (simple recording in police reports) is less
accurate than the method criticized in Carter, where at least the
defendant was given the opportunity to verify the officers' versions
of events.

More importantly here, unlike in Carter, there are

identifiable inconsistencies concerning what occurred during the
encounter with the police.

For instance, did Mr. James make his

admission in response to a question about his employment (R. 73), or
in response to a question about the burglary (R. 70)?
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For instance,

if the detectives were merely seeking to clarify Mr. James unusual
names and birthdate before giving him the Miranda warning and
proceeding with the interrogation (R. 72), why did they ask him
about his address and employment?

Given the subtle nuances that

must be considered when courts are evaluating whether seemingly
innocuous questions are in fact interrogation, the questions must be
recorded accurately.

The detectives' failure to record the

encounter with Mr. James constituted a violation of the law set
forth years ago in Carter.
While the State argues that Mr. James post-Miranda
statements were admissible under Elstady the State admits two
indicators of coercion: the fact that the interrogation occurred
while Mr. James was in custody —

an "inherently coercive"

atmosphere, and the fact that there were two officers interrogating
Mr. James.

Brief of Appellee at 18, 29.

These concessions should

be remembered in light of the State's "heavy" burden to demonstrate
a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights, Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
The State argues that there was no evidence that the
interview took place in an isolated location, or that Mr. James had
no family, friends, or attorney present.

Brief of Appellee at 29.

Given that it was the State's burden to demonstrate the
voluntariness of the confession, it was the State's burden to
demonstrate if Mr. James' family, friends or attorney was present.
E.g. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 463 (Utah 1988).

More

importantly, the record amply demonstrates that during the
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interrogation, there was no one present but Mr. James and the two
detectives,

E>q. R. 69 ("Q: Uh, and who was present during the

course of the interview?"

"A: Another police officer by the name of

Steve Chever, myself, and Mr. James.").
The State chooses to focus on indicia of voluntariness
discussed in State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988).
Appellee at 27-30.

Brief of

The State's limited inquiry into voluntariness

considerations does not diminish the case law discussed at pages 33
through 35 of Mr. James7 opening brief which demonstrates the
coerciveness of the interrogation, which involved two detectives who
interrogated the nineteen-year-old Mr. James in and isolated and
custodial setting in violation of Carter's mandate to make a
reliable recording of custodial interrogations, and who did not
inform Mr. James of his Miranda rights in a timely fashion or until
they had already received his confession.

See e.g. Miranda, 384

U.S. at 475-476 (government bears heavy burden to demonstrate
knowing and voluntary waiver; "any evidence that the accused was
threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show
that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege.").
Compare the facts of this case with those in Oregon v. Elstad, 470
U.S. 298, 301-302, 314-316 (1985)(statements taken in apparent
violation of Miranda were not coerced, where statements were made
before defendant was arrested, when defendant was in his home at day
time with his mother nearby, when police were not intending to
interrogate the defendant but were seeking to inform his mother
about why he was being arrested, and the defendant's statements were
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recorded and he was given the opportunity to modify a typewritten
transcript of his statements).
Because the statements initially taken from Mr. James in
the jail before the Miranda warnings were actually coerced, it was
the State's burden to demonstrate that intervening events allowed
Mr. James to make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda
rights and voluntary post-Miranda admissions.

See Elstad at 310

("When a prior statement is actually coerced, the time that passes
between confessions, the change in place of interrogations, and the
change in identity of the interrogators all bear on whether that
coercion has carried over into the second confession.").

The State

has failed to carry this burden, and Mr. James is therefore entitled
to suppression of both his pre- and post-Miranda admissions.

III.
MR. JAMES STATEMENTS
SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Because Mr. James7 statements should have been suppressed
under the federal constitution, and because the state constitution
must provide at least as much protection as is provided by the
federal constitution, it appears that the Utah Constitution would
call for the suppression of Mr. James7 statements on the basis of
the analysis of points I and II of this brief.

While it may be

unnecessary for this Court to address the state constitutional
issues in this case, this Court may choose to articulate clear state
law, where the federal law provides insufficient guidance for the
police.
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In challenging Mr. James' state constitutional arguments,
the State argues in its summary, as follows:
Defendant has waived the issue of a separate
state constitutional analysis of his claims
because he failed to preserve them. The motion
below failed to provide "thoughtful and probing
analysis" of the state claim. Alternatively, the
different Miranda-type requirements sought to be
established by defendant would only cause
confusion and unworkable direction to police
officers. Since there is no current
contradictory and confusing law under the federal
standard, there is no need to adopt a separate
state standard. A separate requirement for audio
or videotaping of the statements before they are
admissible is a change which "should be made only
after a full hearing of all the policy and
financial implications and with adequate advance
notice to . . . law enforcement." Finally,
federal law regarding admission of statements
obtained after warning which followed previous
unwarned but uncoerced statements is consistent
with current state law and no reason was given
for rejecting the federal case law.
Brief of Appellee at 8.
The memorandum submitted to the trial court explained
several Utah cases demonstrating Utah's interpretation of the Utah
Constitution independently from federal law, to insure that Utah law
is clear and leads to reliable results.

The memorandum referred to

the unique history of this state, which supports the federalist
principle at work in independent state constitutional analysis.

The

memorandum reviewed differing federal and Utah standards for when
Miranda warnings must be given (under federal law, warnings are owed
when there is custodial interrogation, whereas under Utah law,
warnings are owed when the the investigation focuses on suspect or
becomes accusatorial).

The memorandum reviewed the accusatorial

facts and circumstances of Mr. James' case, wherein two detectives
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investigating a particular burglary sought a confession from Mr.
James in the jail when Mr. James had been arrested for the
burglary.

Trial counsel argued that under Salt Lake City v. earner,

664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983), an Article I section 12 case, Mr. James
was entitled to Miranda warnings at the outset of the interview (R.
96).

At the hearing on the separate state constitutional motion to

suppress, trial counsel argued that Oregon v. Elstad should not
apply in this case, because the officers intentionally violated Mr.
James' Miranda rights (T. 28-29).

Trial counsel asked the trial

court to suppress all statements taken in violation of Mr. James'
rights under Utah law.

See R. 94-96, 100-101. The trial court

ruled under the Utah Constitution that the interview of the burglary
suspect by the burglary detectives in the jail was not in an
accusatorial environment (R. 108).
The State's argument that there is no need for a state
standard because federal law is adequate and consistent fails to
appreciate how easily the police can avoid the Miranda warnings
requirement by simply delaying taking the suspect into physical
custody until the interrogation is successful.
McCarty, 469 U.S. 420, 434 (1984).

See Berkemer v.

Under the law explained in the

Article I section 12 case, Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168
(Utah 1983), the police have the obligation to give the warnings
when the interrogation becomes custodial or accusatory, and are thus
given far less discretion to manipulate the warnings.
The State's argument that federal law is adequate and
consistent also fails to appreciate how the Elstad decision allows
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the police to eviscerate Miranda by allowing them to obtain
confessions through Miranda violations and then to perfunctorily
comply with Miranda and obtain redundant confessions as though the
confessions obtained through the Miranda violations had no bearing
on the voluntariness of the post-Miranda confessions.

Article I

section 12 law has traditionally taken a more police-restrictive
approach, requiring the state to demonstrate that confessions
following police illegalities are given in circumstances where "the
effect of the primary improper inducement was so entirely
obliterated from his mind that the subsequent confession could not
have been in the slightest degree influenced by it; and if there be
any doubt on this question, it must be resolved in favor of the
prisoner, and the confession must be excluded."

State v. Crank, 142

P.2d 178, 184 and 192 (Utah 1943)(citation omitted).
The State implies that a recording requirement for police
interrogations should not be imposed without study of the impact
that the requirement would pose or without advance notice of the
requirement.

Brief of Appellee at 43. The argument overlooks the

fact that the Utah Supreme Court has already informed the police
that the integrity of criminal cases may very well hinge on the
accuracy of the recording of purported confessions.
Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989).

State v.

Where Nevada appears satisfied

with a jury's resolution of the reliability of police testimony
concerning the events of interrogation, brief of Appellee at 42,
Utah courts have repeatedly recognized an independent judicial duty
to insure the protection of fundamental rights such as those at
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issue in this case.

E.g. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 464 n.76

(Utah 1988) ("'[I]t is the duty of an appellate court . . . 'to
examine the entire record and make and independent determination of
the ultimate issue of voluntariness.'")(citations omitted).

Given

the inexpensiveness and ready availability of recording devices, it
would seem to the benefit of the State to require the police to
record interrogations.

Unless there is police misconduct to hide,

it would seem that a reliable recording of police interrogations
would greatly simplify the State's burdens to demonstrate that
confessions were made in legal circumstances.

See e.g. Miranda, 384

U.S. at 444-445 (describing state's burdens prior to the admission
of statements made during custodial interrogation).

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court's rulings denying
Mr. James' motions to suppress the statements taken in violation of
his fundamental rights.
Respectfully submitted this

J_ day of

1993.

EJ^i^BETHA.
/^ttgxn&y
for

BOWMAfr
Mr. James
Ja:

Attorney for Mr. James
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APPENDIX 1
Text of Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law.
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is cilleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.
In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:
Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon
the facts without a jury or with an advisory
jury, the court shall find the facts specially
and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant
to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court shall
similarly set forth the findings of fact and
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds
of its action. Requests for findings are not
necessary for purposes of review. Findings of
fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly

erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a
master, to the extent that the court adopts them,
shall be considered as the findings of the
court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and
recorded in open court following the close of the
evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court
need not enter findings of fact and conclusions
of law in rulings on motions, except as provided
in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a
brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules
12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion
is based on more than one ground.
Amendment V to the Constitution of the United States provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States provides in
pertinent part:
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

